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Abstract 
When buying a stock, it is impossible to take hundreds or thousands of stocks into consideration. 
A way for investors to simplify the search problem is to make the choice from stocks that have 
caught their attention. Motivated by the theories of human cognitive boundaries affecting investor 
behaviour, this thesis investigates the impact of attention effects on the behaviour of investors 
using a social trading platform, Shareville. Using a novel dataset from Shareville, we test the causal 
relation between the order volume and different attention proxies; comments, comments on a 
Friday and comments’ effect on buy orders. In addition, a sub sample with only the thirty largest 
and the thirty smallest Swedish firms is used. Our results indicate that order volume can be 
predicted by the number of comments on an asset, but that volume also has a positive and 
significant effect on the number of comments.  Second, there is no evidence for that investors are 
more likely to show attention driven trading behaviour on a Friday. Third, we find that comments 
increase buy order volume more, compared to sell order volume. Fourth, the regressions containing 
firm size and profitability do not show an effect on order volume. We conclude that while there is 
a significant effect of comments on order volume, it is likely that our equations suffer from 
endogeneity due to reversed causality.  
Keywords: Behavioural Finance, Irrational Investors, Attention, Financial Markets, Social 
Trading Platform 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the field of behavioural finance one theory is that humans are boundedly rational. There are 
constraints to how much information the brain can process. In order to make a decision, it is more 
convenient to make a choice out of a selection of ten alternatives rather than a thousand. A way to 
downsize the selection is to make a choice from alternatives that have caught our attention (Barber 
and Odean, 2008). Barber and Odean mean that stocks covered by the media, stocks with abnormal 
returns and stocks experiencing abnormal trading volume, grab the attention of investors. They 
confirm this by finding effects of attention driven buying on trading volume and stock prices. 
Barber and Odean (2008) also find that attention effects seem to have stronger impact on investors' 
buying behaviour than on their selling behaviour. 
Other researchers have some proxies for attention such as a stock’s market capitalization, 
profitability or analyst coverage. Some researchers have also hypothesised that on Fridays, 
investors are likely to be distracted by the upcoming weekend (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). 
DellaVigna and Pollet test their hypothesis by using a Friday dummy and their findings give 
support for their argument.  
There is an increasing interest for how media might affect investors' trading behaviour amongst 
researchers and professionals. In the attention literature, researchers use different methods and 
forms of media as attention proxies, however there seem to be effects of economic significance 
irrespective of study type. Barber and Odean (2008) test and find that investors buy stocks exposed 
in economy related magazines. Engelberg et al. (2012) investigate effects of media exposure, in 
the form of a TV-show giving stock recommendations, on investor behaviour. They confirm that 
investors buy stocks recommended in the show and thus show attention driven buying behaviour. 
The digital evolution of media, have brought novel media proxies for attention. Mondria and Wu 
(2013) proxy attention with the number of times a stock ticker is googled per day, and find 
evidence for attention driven buying. Media, in the shape of social media platforms, has not been 
investigated to any extent by limited attention literature. The recent emerge of social media has 
led to an increasing selection of trading podcasts, Facebook investing threads and development of 
social trading platforms. This further motivates investigation of the role this novel media shape 
might have.   
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Compared to earlier research, this study uses exclusive data from the social trading platform 
Shareville, to test for attention driven buying behaviour amongst retail investors. Shareville gives 
us a unique data set as well as a new proxy for attention; comments, which is the number of times 
an asset is commented on the platform. The data also makes it possible to analyse the attention 
proxy comments in more depth, by investigating the case of reversed causality. The study’s main 
contribution is the novel proxy comments, a reversed causality test of the new proxy and a unique 
data set. With the impact of social media on today’s society, the idea of testing attention driven 
buying behaviour in the context of a trading forum is timely and interesting both for the investors 
and the companies themselves.   
Shareville, at the time being the only social trading platform in Sweden, aims to facilitate 
investment choices for investors by enabling them to follow other investors’ portfolios and 
discussions of their investments. The platform is owned and connected to Nordnet, a trading site 
where investors buy and sell tradeable assets. The idea of Shareville is that the user can chose to 
be anonymous or not, and Shareville does not register or provide any information about the value 
of the portfolio in terms of monetary size (Nordnet, 2016b). The portfolio is shown to other 
followers in percentages of how much the investor owns of each asset. There are 93 024 portfolios 
registered on the platform (Shareville, 2016a). Several of the most followed portfolios are well 
known professionals in the finance business (Shareville, 2016b). As a member of the network you 
can choose to follow successful investors, and get notified by email when they buy or sell a stock. 
Investors using Shareville can comment on Nordnet’s tradeable assets. It is of importance to clarify 
that comments are not necessarily a buy or a sell recommendation, but it is whenever a stock is 
mentioned in a discussion thread, at a portfolio wall or as a comment accompanying an order of 
an asset. When an investor with a Shareville profile comments or mentions a certain asset, other 
investors are likely to pay attention to that and this might affect their trading behaviour. 
1.2 Hypotheses 
This study aims to investigate the impact of attention effects on the behaviour of investors using 
Shareville. By using econometric techniques, we estimate the causal relationship between different 
attention proxies and order volume. With this aim, we test four hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is that comments on assets should grab investors’ attention and by that increase 
trading volume. We also expect that endogeneity due to reversed causality might be a problem, 
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hence we do a reversed causality test with comments as the dependent variable and order volume 
as the explanatory variable. 
The second hypothesis is that investors should suffer more from cognitive constraints on Fridays 
and thus the effect of comments should have stronger attention grabbing effects on a Friday. We 
hypothesise that a comment on a Friday, therefore should increase order volume more than on 
other weekdays.  
The third hypothesis is that attention effects from comments should have a larger effect, causing 
the volume to increase more, for buy orders than for sell orders.  
The fourth hypothesis is that other proxies for attention; market capitalization and return on equity, 
also should have a positive effect on the traded volume. We also expect attention effects to be 
stronger for stocks with a small market capitalization. 
The above hypotheses are tested by either running cross sectional or pooled regressions. 
1.3 Delimitations and limitations 
Due to the characteristics and uniqueness of the data set it is hard to use some econometric 
techniques, like instrumental variables or additional control variables. An example is that the 
variable comments is hard to instrument. 
Shareville has existed for barely three years and the data used covers one and a half years, which 
gives that it can be hard to capture the true effects. The young age of Shareville is likely a reason 
why some variables used for the analysis have rather small magnitudes with distributions clustered 
close to zero, see Figure 1 and 3 in Appendix. 
1.4 Structure 
The remainder of the thesis starts with a theory section, section two, which is an introduction of 
the traditional concepts of finance and the efficient market theory. Section three presents reported 
results from existing literature and explains in more detail the motivation for the hypotheses we 
test. Section four describes the data and variables used in our equations. In section five, we describe 
the methodology and the different equations used in order to test our hypotheses. Section six 
provides the results of the hypotheses tests. Section seven gives a conclusion of the thesis.   
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Theory 
The efficient market hypothesis is a central concept for the traditional theories of finance. A 
general definition of the efficiency concept is “A market in which prices always “fully reflect” 
available information is called efficient” (Fama 1970, s. 383). Fama further defines the different 
forms of market efficiency as the weak, the semi-strong and the strong form. The semi-strong form 
means that the available information set, is all publicly available information. Strong form means 
that all information, including private and insider information, is in the information set. Testing 
the semi-strong form could for example be tested on whether a brokerage firm's recommendation 
is efficiently incorporated in the stock price or not. Fama (1970) argues that tests of the semi-
strong form support the efficient market hypothesis but that the strong form should be viewed as 
a benchmark since research find that insider trading gives abnormal returns. Considering Fama’s 
review we can assume that the semi-strong form is what best describes the markets today. The 
semi-strong form implies that second-hand information, like a stock recommendation based on 
already publicly available information should not enable abnormal returns. It also means that only 
when adding new information, an increase in trading volume will occur, due to investors' adjusting 
for the new price to the new intrinsic value. In an efficient market the assumption that security 
prices fully reflect all available information should invalidate the theory about media affecting 
abnormal returns, Fama (1970). 
Evidence from research suggests that the topic of market efficiency might be more complex than 
assuming that prices efficiently reflect all available public information. The supporters of 
behavioural finance, have a growing amount of findings showing situations where the market is 
not efficient. Robert Shiller (2003) states that we have to accept that life is not as easy as assuming 
the efficient market theory always holds, and points out that even Fama in 1970 spoke about some 
anomalies of serial correlation of stock returns, even though he claimed they were too small to be 
of any significance.  
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2.2 Existing literature 
2.2.1 Bounded rationality 
There are many empirical studies of market efficiency which tests the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency. This concerns whether stock prices efficiently adjust to other information that is 
obviously publicly available. Bushee et al. (2009) investigate how media, as an information 
intermediary, affects the capital markets. An “information intermediary” is in this context an agent 
who provides new and useful information about a stock or a company. Bushee et al. (2009) test 
the role of media around earnings announcements, in the sense that media mitigate the information 
asymmetry around this announcement. The results show that the press as an information 
intermediary, fulfils multiple roles, including providing investors with new and relevant 
information about the company. To conclude, Bushee et al. (2009) states that the press has 
potential to influence the degree of information asymmetry across investors, and that greater press 
coverage during earnings announcements the more reduced will the bid-ask spreads be. They also 
state that the press provides more depth in the market.  
When Barber et al. (2011) investigate the theory of market efficiency, they suggest that investors 
suffer more or less from overconfidence; they tend to be unrealistic about how high their returns 
are going to be which leads to ignoring information that might be of relevance. The results from 
their research are supported by the well-known concept of bounded rationality. This term is a 
contradiction to that humans make rational decisions, because of cognitive limitations and 
uncertain future predictions (Tseng, 2006). The argument about bounded rationality raises the 
question whether the financial markets are efficient or not. Traders, investors and other market 
participants are all exposed to different information and all suffer more or less from time as a 
scarce resource. If the argument about bounded rationality holds, the efficient market theory is 
violated.  
2.2.2 Attention driven buying behaviour 
Odean (1999) finds patterns in excessive trading showing that investors buy stocks experiencing 
abnormal performance. As explanation for this behaviour, Odean (1999) means there are 
thousands of stocks to trade and a way to downsize the selection is to make a choice from 
alternatives that have caught investors’ attention. Investors are more likely to pay attention to 
stocks experiencing extreme returns and thus more likely to trade those. Barber and Odean (2008) 
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further investigate this theme and find evidence in line with Odean's (1999). Barber and Odean 
(2008) mean that the rational investor only has a limited number of hours to consider stocks and 
that attention is a scarce resource. When buying a stock, investors are faced with a search problem 
in the sense that there are thousands of stocks from which to choose. We are not able to rank all of 
these, thus we limit our choice set. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that the human cognitive 
capacity is a scarce resource and thus attention is limited and all available information cannot be 
processed.  
Attention is hard to measure directly as Barber and Odean (2008) conclude with the quote “a direct 
measure would be to go back in time and, each day, question…investors… as to which stocks they 
thought about that day”. Therefore, researchers use proxies for attention. Odean (1999) proposes 
that stocks showing abnormal returns and stocks covered by the media are likely to grab an 
investors attention and thus be proxies for attention. Barber and Odean (2008) investigate and find 
that stocks covered by media in terms of newspapers and stocks with extreme one day returns grab 
investors’ attention. 
The findings of Odean (1999) suggests that individual investors are more likely to buy stocks that 
are attention grabbing rather than sell. Other researchers have reported similar results (Barber and 
Odean, 2008), (Engelberg et al. 2012). Barber and Odean (2008) reason the stronger buy effect is 
due to that the search problem is more severe for buying than for selling a stock. Retail investors 
have limited possibilities to short sell and thus in general only sell stocks they already own, hence 
the asymmetric behaviour. 
Studies investigating investor’s trading behaviour have found proof of the disposition effect, that 
investors sell winners and keep losers. Odean's (1998) research on the topic show support of the 
disposition effect that Shefrin and Statman (1985) foretold. Barber and Odean (2008) find that 
there are larger differences between investors buying and selling on days with negative stock 
returns. They argue that the disposition effect could be a possible explanation for this pattern. 
2.2.3 Other proxies for attention 
Another approach to proxy for attention is the use of a dummy variable for Friday. DellaVigna and 
Pollet (2009) argue that if investors suffer from cognitive constraints, the investors’ attention 
should be more scarce on Fridays since investors could be distracted by plans for the upcoming 
weekend. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) mean that managers are likely to time bad earnings 
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announcement on days with low attention, such as a Friday, due to that investors are distracted. 
They find that Friday earnings announcements have 0.5 percent lower abnormal return and are 45 
percent more likely to be a negative earnings surprise. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) argue this is 
supportive of the attention hypothesis. 
Firm size is another proxy for attention, that is used by Hong et al. (2000) when they test for slow 
information diffusion with momentum returns on stocks. The slower the information diffusion, the 
more profitable is the momentum trading. Their argument is that investors may have higher costs 
getting information about small stocks and thus information about those stocks get out slower 
amongst the investors. Then information diffusion amongst investors shall increase with size. 
Hong et al. (2000) also use analyst coverage as proxy for information flow, where low coverage 
stocks have slower information diffusion. They find that profitability of momentum strategies 
declines as market capitalization increases and the same result is found for increasing analyst 
coverage. Also their findings give evidence for that analyst coverage has largest marginal effect 
on small stocks. 
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) investigate investors’ home biasedness, meaning that local traders 
tend to pay more attention to stocks that have been mentioned in local media. Using local media 
as an information provider, they predict that local media has strong effects on local trading, after 
controlling for earnings announcements, investor and newspaper characteristics. 
2.2.4 Media and novel attention proxies 
Media is an information intermediary between firms and investors and might therefore affect their 
trading behaviour and provide us with new attention proxies. Several studies report different 
relations between media publications and reactions in the stock market. Seasholes and Wu (2007) 
show that individual investors tend to be net buyers of attention grabbing events. Their findings 
are in line with other research on media leading to over reaction of stock prices (Barber and Odean, 
2008) (Engelberg et al., 2012). Peress (2008) finds that media coverage has a negative effect on 
the under reaction anomaly PEAD, and thus increases market efficiency. Whether it’s insights of 
under reaction or over reaction, it proposes “a potentially important role for the media in shaping 
the behaviour of the stock market” Hong and Stein (2007, s. 118).  
Today media, covering information about stocks, is not only in the form of newspapers or TV-
shows but can be discussion forums for investors or social trading platforms. With media evolving 
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its new digital form provides us with new ways of investigating attention effects and new proxies 
for attention. The Google search engine is increasingly used to investigate attention effects. Da et 
al. (2011) find evidence of that google search volume for a ticker predicts stock returns. Mondria 
and Wu (2013) conduct similar study using Google search volume and find support for attention 
theories. Social media like Facebook, Twitter and social trading platforms have in contrast been 
less touched upon by attention researchers. However, other behavioural finance fields have 
increasingly started exploring this. Karabulut (2013) uses Facebook Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) to investigate how investor sentiment may affect stock prices. He finds that GNH predicts 
changes in stock prices as well as trading volume. By using textual analysis on the most used social 
media platforms in the US, comScore, Chen et al. (2014) test and find that written opinions about 
stocks there can predict stock returns and earnings surprises.  
2.2.5 The difficulties in measuring attention 
Due to the difficulties of measuring attention, testing attention hypotheses can be hard, and 
showing a causal relationship between trading volume or stock returns and attention is therefore 
difficult. Despite researchers using different proxies for investor attention to come around this 
problem, each proxy still has flaws. For example, the used proxy abnormal stock returns might 
result in more attention on that stock but more attention might cause extreme stock returns. This 
makes it hard to interpret the true impact of the attention effects. Clearly, most proxies tend to have 
the advantage of being simple, intuitive and having roots in causal evidence but they are not results 
from theoretic work on attention (Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko 2013). 
2.2.6 Implications on an aggregate level 
Researchers have reported that attention effects do not only affect investors trading behaviour but 
do also leave traces on an aggregate level in trading volume or stock returns. When an event about 
a stock or a company hits the news, trading volume will most likely be greater than normal. Even 
though this is against the market’s ability to incorporate all news, significant events will probably 
catch investor attention and cause an abnormal trading volume, Barber and Odean (2008). It is 
reasonable to think that cognitive constraints are most binding for retail investors thus they are 
more affected by attention effects. The findings by Barber and Odean (2008) and Engelberg et al. 
(2012) support this line of reasoning. Engelberg et al. (2012) show that the retail investors’ 
excessive buying of attention grabbing stocks can be seen in abnormal volume effects.  The 
analysis by Engelberg et al. (2012) is based on a TV-program about stocks in order to see the 
  
9 
 
effects on the stock price. They concluded that the more time spent on the stock in the program, 
the larger the price increase the day after the recommendation of the stock. This reflects the short-
run behaviour of the stock, in the long-run the price went back to its original level. This is an effect 
of how media can provide misleading stock prices at the market level.  
2.2.7 Critique of behavioural finance 
The empirical findings that media causes abnormal returns on stocks have been criticized for 
having a vague alternative hypothesis postulating market inefficiency. This is vague because it 
does not focus on a specific alternative to market efficiency. The alternative should explain the 
range of results better. It should focus on the expected value of abnormal returns that generates 
deviations from zero in both directions depending on if the media exposure was negative or 
positive (Fama, 1998). 
In market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioural finance, there is an argument about 
whether the selection of events is random or not (Fama, 1998). This can be related to criticism 
about over reaction, that researchers are more likely to pick events that cause abnormal returns. 
The researchers are often content with the overreaction or underreaction and are willing to infer 
that both outcomes reject the hypothesis about market efficiency (Fama, 1998). Fama also argues 
that if a reasonable change in the method of estimating the abnormal return causes an anomaly to 
disappear, it may not be evidential enough. The doubts about these anomalies are results of 
replication and robustness checks that followed publication of the original studies. As a conclusion 
of Fama’s paper about market efficiency, the theory of anomalies is subject to happen by chance 
and does not provide long term evidence for market inefficiency.  Even if the sample is large, it 
will be interesting to know the average probability of an abnormal return among the market (Fama, 
1998). 
As a reply to Fama’s theory about market efficiency, Robert Shiller publishes in his article from 
2003, that market efficiency can be extremely wrong in some senses. He gives the example that 
efficient market theory may lead to drastically incorrect interpretations of major events such as 
market bubbles. Schiller means that the arguments about that anomalies tend to disappear as time 
passes, are weak. In all disciplines, initial claims of important discoveries are often taken down by 
later research. Also, he means that the fact that markets adjust to normality after an over- or under 
reaction, is no evidence that markets are fully rational.    
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3. Data 
3.1 Descriptives of the data 
Shareville is a social media platform that is connected to Nordnet. The data is from comments and 
trades through the Shareville platform, on the tradeable assets on Nordnet. Additional information 
on return of equity and market capitalisation for certain firms was retrieved using the Orbis 
database (Orbis 2016). The tradeable assets are assets investors can trade on Nasdaq Stockholm, 
First North, Oslo stock exchange, Copenhagen stock exchange, Helsinki stock exchange, 
Aktietorget, NGM, Nordic MTF, Nasdaq, NYSE Pink sheet, Bulletin Board, Toronto stock 
exchange, Xetra, Euronext and London Stock Exchange (Nordnet 2016a). Assets are from the 
countries Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Europe, Canada and USA. Assets incorporates 
stocks, funds, certificates, options and futures. Shareville’s investors are primarily from Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Finland (Nordnet 2016c). Most of Nordnet’s closed trades 2015, are done 
by investors located in Sweden, 9.7 million (Nordnet 2016c). Second and third most closed trades 
are done in Denmark and Finland with 4.0 million and 3.6 million closed trades respectively. Least 
closed trades in 2015 have Norwegian investors at Nordnet with 2.5 million. 
Observations from the period 2014-03-23 until 2014-10-01 are excluded due to that there was no 
registered order volume from trade through Shareville in that period. This leaves us with a data set 
with observations from 2014-10-01 till 2016-03-22. Observations where an instrument is traded 
but not commented on that day has been excluded. This leaves us with 745 381 observations.  
The data has been adjusted for outliers using the Grubbs test with a confidence level of 99. The 
Grubbs test excluded 25,514 number of observations which is 3.42% of the total observations. The 
dataset used for the analysis then contains 719,867 observations1. 
  
                                                 
1 Which is 539 trading days and 21 854 traded assets. The total number of comments in the data set is 1.981 
million. 
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3.2 Variable presentation 
Section four continuous with an introduction and further description of the variables used in the 
regressions. This is followed by descriptive statistics. A correlation table as well as distribution 
tables are provided in Appendix.   
 
 
In order to validate our attention proxies and test whether there are attention effects present 
amongst the investors using Shareville, the variable volume is used as dependent variable. Since 
this variable is unknown in terms of monetary size, it is a nominal variable, which means it can be 
used only as a measure of interest. The daily order volume is divided in buy order volume and sell 
order volume whereas the comments variable is the total number of comments for a stock per day. 
The distribution of volume is positively skewed, see Appendix Figure 1 and Figure 2. When we 
exclude outliers from the data set the skewness is reduced. 
Table 1: Description of variables  
The table presents the variables used in our regressions. 
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION 
  
Volume The daily, closing, buy/sell order volume.  
  
Comments The daily, number of comments on Shareville.  
  
Comments*DummyFriday Interaction variable modelling the effect of comments on a 
Friday. 
  
DummyFriday Models difference between Fridays and all other weekdays. 
  
Comments*DummyBuy Interaction variable modelling the effect of a comment on buy 
order volume. 
  
DummyBuy Models difference between buy and sell orders. 
  
MC The average market capitalization for a firm in the year of 2014. 
  
ROE Return on equity, for 2014, calculated using the net income. 
  
Comments*DummySmallcap Interaction variable modelling the effect of a comment on a 
small cap firm. 
  
DummySmallcap Models the difference between small cap and large cap firms. 
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We use the variable comments as a proxy for the interest of one particular asset. The variable 
comments is our main proxy for attention and it is the daily number of times a certain asset, that 
is tradeable through Nordnet, is mentioned on Shareville. It is important to highlight that comments 
are not necessarily buy or sell recommendations, but are whenever an asset is mentioned by an 
investor on the Shareville platform. When a tradeable asset is commented, an investor is likely to 
pay attention to this asset and therefore it should be a measure of attention. The distribution of the 
variable comments is positively skewed. When we exclude outliers from the data set the skewness 
is reduced, see Appendix Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
With inspiration from DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) an interaction term is used to measure the 
effect of comments made on a Friday. This captures time varying effects of attention.  
To test the attention proxy firm size, as used by Hong et al. (2000), the variable market 
capitalisation is used as a proxy. The variable return on equity is tested as attention proxy, since 
investors are likely to pay attention to a firm showing high return on equity. With inspiration from 
the findings of Hong et al. (2000), that analyst coverage has a larger marginal effect on small 
stocks, an interaction term of comments and the small cap dummy is used to capture this effect. 
Due to that our data set contains not only firms, but also funds and derivatives we test the Market 
cap variable, ROE and attention effect on small cap by using data from a sub sample of sixty 
Swedish firms listed on the Swedish markets. This sixty firm sub sample consists of the thirty 
firms with the largest market capitalization and the thirty firms with the smallest market 
capitalization, on average during the last three years. The choice of subset is motivated by previous 
research on home bias and by that most of Nordnet’s customers are located in Sweden (Nordnet, 
2016c). Correlation amongst the regressors comments, ROE and MC is low, see Table 6 in 
Appendix.  
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Table 2: Descriptives of the variables 
 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Volume 719,867 2.721 3.244 0 22 
Comments 719,867 5.075 6.614 1 45 
DummyBuy 707,419 0.525 0.499 0 1 
Comments*DummyBuy 707,419 2.576 5.170 0 45 
DummyFriday 719,867 0.190 0.392 0 1 
Comments*DummyFriday 719,867 0.963 3.502 0 45 
DummySmallcap 719,867 0.005 0.069 0 1 
Comments*DummySmallcap 719,867 0.017 0.430 0 43 
MC 719,867 2,683.000 22,206.000 5 466,539 
ROE 719,867 0.688 24.980 -327 941 
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4. Methodology 
The method is set in order to test our hypotheses and this is primarily to assess the causal relation 
between our proxies for attention and the closing order volume. Specifically, we investigate how 
attention effects can alter investor behaviour and thus be visible as an effect on the closing order 
volume.  
In order to test the causality, we run two type of regressions; cross sectional and pooled. The cross 
sectional regressions are run by using a data set that only varies by asset, not over time. The pooled 
regressions are run by using a data set that consists of an asset’s average, over time, of each 
variable.  
For the pooled regressions we use panel data, data that varies by asset and by time. Due to the 
nature of our data the panel data is unbalanced, since some assets are traded on more dates than 
others. 
To test our first hypothesis, we run regressions on equation 1a and 1b: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (Eq. 1a) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛾1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (Eq. 1b) 
where i is instrument and t is time. Equation 1a is used to tests that comments on assets should 
grab investors’ attention and should increase volume by estimating how comments impact 
closing order volume. To investigate the expected case of reversed causality being present in 
estimations of equation 1a, we use equation 1b. Equation 1b estimates how comments might be 
affected by volume. We test both equation 1a and 1b by running both cross sectional and pooled 
regressions. 
To test the second and third hypothesis we run a pooled regression on equation 2:  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 +           
+𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐵𝑢𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦 +  𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐵𝑢𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (Eq. 2) 
where t is day.   
When testing the fourth hypothesis we use data from the sub sample consisting of the 30 largest 
and the 30 smallest Swedish firms, with respect to three-year average market capitalization, that is 
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tradeable on Shareville. To test the fourth hypothesis, we use the sub sample to run a pooled 
regression on equation 3:  
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 
+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (Eq. 3)    
Another widely used method in order to investigate the effect of an event on asset prices or volume 
is to do an event study. This is used when measuring the effect of how company policy changes 
affect the stock performance. The main limitation is that precise estimation periods are not easy to 
determine (Brown and Warner, 1984). In the case of this study with Shareville, the trade-off 
between the number of days used in an event study and the potential risk of another parameter 
affecting the closing order volume is another reason to why we chose not to use this type of study 
in order to analyse our data. 
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5. Results and Analysis 
In the following, we will present the results in detail, in order of the four hypothesis. The results 
are analysed and commented on in relation to the theoretical framework. 
 
Table 3: Regressions of eq. 1a and eq. 1b 
This table shows the results from testing the first hypothesis by running both a cross 
sectional regression and a pooled regression on eq. 1a and eq. 1b. 
 (Eq. 1a) 
Cross sectional 
(Eq. 1b) 
Cross sectional 
(Eq. 1a) 
Pooled 
(Eq. 1b) 
Pooled 
 Volume Comments Volume Comments 
     
Comments 0.454***  0.429***  
 (0.002)  (0.001)  
Volume  2.141***  1.782*** 
  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Constant 0.471*** -0.938*** 0.546*** 0.228*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Observations 21,854 21,854 719,867 719,867 
R-squared 0.972 0.972 0.764 0.764 
Adj. R-squared 0.972 0.972 0.764 0.764 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the cross sectional and pooled regression of equation 1a suggests that comments on 
assets grab investors’ attention and increase trading volume. The cross sectional regression of 
equation 1a has a positive and statistically significant coefficient implying that one more comment 
will increase the closing order volume with 0.454 units on average. Also the pooled regression on 
equation 1a shows a statistically significant, positive effect on the daily closing order volume. Due 
to characteristics of the data set, that Shareville is a novelty, it’s hard to tell if the results are 
economically significant. Economic significance is in terms of whether the estimated effects are 
large enough to have an economic impact that actually matters on the dependent variable or not. 
When putting our estimations in relation to other research, it’s not obvious if our results are 
economically significant due to different methodology. However, our method and results are 
similar to the study of Engelberg et al. (2012) and they argue their findings should be considered 
economically significant. Thus, the result indicate that volume can be predicted by the social media 
coverage comments.  
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Our result is in line with the findings of Barber and Odean (2008) showing that investors purchase 
stocks that have a first impact on their attention. They suggest that if an unusual high number of 
investors trade a stock after an event, it is related to the investors paying attention to that stock. 
This implies that the event causes the investors’ attention and also affects their trading behaviour. 
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) have related research outcome, they conclude that local media 
coverage on specific firm events can predict the interest of local trading.  The coefficient of 
comments, in the estimation of equation 1a, is lower in the pooled regression compared to the cross 
sectional which has no obvious explanation. A possible explanation could be that the positive skew 
of the variables is more prominent in the pooled regression, which would lower the magnitude of 
the pooled regression. In the pooled cases the R-squared is lower, which can be due to increased 
total variability. 
The dataset used makes it possible to address the likely endogeneity problem in terms of reversed 
causality; do the number of comments on an asset cause an increase in volume or does the volume 
cause more comments? It’s rational to hypothesise that trading volume on an asset may affect 
comments. This reversed causality problem is discussed in the similar study of Engelberg and 
Parsons (2011), where local media might reflect the behaviour of the investors more than they are 
affected by media coverage. To investigate the case of reversed causality, we run the regressions 
with closing order volume as the explanatory variable in equation 1b (Bell and Bryman 2011). The 
results from cross sectional and pooled regressions on equation 1b tests and show that there is a 
reversed causality since volume has a positive effect on comments, that is statistically significant 
and possibly of economic significance. The results suggest that the estimation of equation 1a 
suffers from endogeneity in shape of reversed causality. The high correlation between volume and 
comments is in line with the reversed causality, see Table 6 in Appendix. Similar to the estimation 
of equation 1a, the estimation of 1b is of smaller magnitude when running the pooled regression. 
It seems the effects are somewhat different when letting the variables also vary over time. 
However, it’s hard to argue in favour for a particular explanation. 
From the results of the cross sectional and pooled regression of equation 1a and 1b we cannot 
reject our first hypothesis. Moreover, the results from the regressions of 1a and 1b showing dual 
causality further motivates investigation of comments as attention proxy. Further investigation 
with additional variables is one approach. Also results from conducting Ramsey RESET tests on 
the pooled equation 1a motivates adding more variables and continuing to assume a linear relation 
between comments and volume. 
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The results presented in Table 3 are robust for tests with data including outliers, see Appendix 
Table 3.1. Worth noting is also that although the variables volume and comments are positively 
skewed, the residuals of estimating equation 1a can be seen as normally distributed, see Appendix 
Figure 7. The residuals can be seen as a proxy for the error term, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed in order for OLS to hold.  
 
Table 4: Regression of eq. 2 
This table shows the results from testing the 
second and the third hypothesis by running a 
pooled regression of equation 2. 
 (Eq. 2) 
 Volume 
  
Comments 0.364*** 
 (0.001) 
Comments*dummyFriday -0.003 
 (0.002) 
Comments*dummyBuy 0.139*** 
 (0.001) 
DummyFriday 0.014** 
 (0.006) 
DummyBuy -0.155*** 
 (0.005) 
Constant 0.621*** 
 (0.004) 
  
Observations 707,419 
R-squared 0.791 
F-statistic 80 816.500 
Prob. > F 0.000 
Adj. R-squared 0.791 
   
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from the pooled regression of equation 2 reject the second hypothesis, that is due to 
attention being more scarce on Fridays, investors shall show stronger attention driven trading on 
Fridays than on other weekdays. The coefficient of comments*dummyFriday estimates that a 
comment on a Friday decreases the trading volume. One possible explanation is DellaVigna’s and 
Pollet’s (2009) argument that managers are likely to time bad earnings announcement on days with 
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low attention, such as a Friday, due to that investors are distracted. Then one might think that 
comments on a Friday reduce volume because the comments may be on negative news and the 
disposition effect makes investors to keep losers. However, due to the insignificance of the 
coefficient for comments*dummyFriday, the negative effect cannot be said to differ from zero. 
When DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) discuss their findings they argue that another possible 
explanation is that the firms releasing news on Fridays may have different characteristics compared 
to other firms. In our case it’s possible that the investors commenting on a Friday does not have as 
many followers, compared to more popular investors, and therefore the comments on a Friday has 
no significant effect on volume. According to the findings of DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) it is 
highly uniquely that the different firm characteristics should affect both earnings announcements 
and the following drift at the same time. However, in our case, it’s reasonable to think there may 
be a difference in characteristics between investors commenting on a Friday and other investors, 
that can cluster on a Friday. The argument would be that investors, in contrast to firms, have a 
more pronounced difference in behaviour on certain weekdays. Amongst the most popular 
portfolios, several of them claim to be well known professionals (Shareville 2016b). Then one 
might think the well-known investors end their trading week when they end their work week and 
thus they might not be the ones commenting assets on Fridays. 
The dummy Friday shows that trading volume is significantly higher on Fridays compared to other 
weekdays. Barber and Odean (2008) comment that more sell limit orders execute on a day when 
the market is rising.  According to the common debate, on Fridays, returns tend to be higher and 
thus the volume would be higher. Our data does not distinguish between what is market orders and 
limit orders, which makes it hard to analyse further. 
The third hypothesis, that attention effects shall increase buy order volume more than sell order 
volume, cannot be rejected based on the results from regression of equation 2. The results also 
suggest that the buy order volume on average is significantly lower than sell order volume. Again 
the reasoning of Barber and Odean (2008) about the disposition effect may be a possible 
explanation for the difference between buying and selling behaviour. During Shareville’s lifetime 
one could argue there has been longer upmarket periods than downmarket. This may give that 
investors sell their winners which gives that the sell order volume is estimated to be relatively 
higher.  
  
20 
 
 In the pooled regression of equation 2, the R-squared has increased compared to the pooled 
regression of 1a, which implies that the additional explanatory variables in equation 2 better 
explain the variation in the dependent variable volume. R-squared can increase due to additional 
variables rather than the additional variables explanatory power. Therefore, adjusted R-squared is 
interesting, since it only increases if the additional variables explain more than what can be 
predicted by chance. For equation 2 the adjusted R-squared has increased, compared to the pooled 
regression of equation 1b, which indicates that the additional variables are beneficial. 
The F-statistic shows that our dependent variables are jointly significant and that at least one of 
our estimated coefficients are different from zero. The F-statistic then indicates that equation 2 can 
be used to predict volume in some sense. 
 
Table 5: Regression of eq. 3  
This table shows the results from testing the 
fourth hypothesis with a pooled regression 
equation 3.  
 (Eq. 3) 
 Volume 
  
Comments 0.440*** 
 (0.004) 
MC -0.000 
 (0.000) 
ROE -0.000* 
 (0.000) 
Comments*dummySmallcap 0.008 
 (0.011) 
DummySmallcap -0.114*** 
 (0.044) 
Constant 0.603*** 
 (0.033) 
  
Observations 20,901 
R-squared 0.747 
F-statistic  6482.640 
Prob. > F 0.000 
Adj. R-squared 0.747 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The fourth hypothesis, that other proxies for attention shall increase order volume, is rejected when 
tested by estimating equation 3. The effect of market capitalization has the opposite sign compared 
to expected and it’s insignificant. The estimated effect of return on equity is the opposite and it’s 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level. However, it should be considered as economically 
insignificant. The volume effect of a comment on a small cap stock is positive as hypothesized but 
it is both statistically and economically insignificant. The closing order volume is significantly 
lower for small cap stocks. Although our primary attention proxy using a stock size variable is 
insignificant, the significant coefficient for small cap stock suggests there might be some support 
for that size is a proxy for attention. The argument would then be that the stocks considered to be 
in the category of largest stocks get relatively more attention and thus they are traded more. 
 In the pooled regression of equation 3, the R-squared has decreased compared to the pooled 
regression of 1a, which implies that the additional explanatory variables in equation 3 does not 
improve the explanation of the variation in the dependent variable volume. The adjusted R-squared 
for equation 3 is lower compared to the pooled regression of equation 1a. The F-statistic for 
equation 3 has also decreased compared to the F-statistic of equation 1a. However, the F-statistic 
still shows that our dependent variables are jointly significant and that at least one of our estimated 
coefficients are different from zero. This can be seen as an indication that we can predict volume 
in some sense with equation 3.  
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6. Conclusion 
We have tested the attention hypothesis, that investors trade assets that grabs their attention. The 
test was done by running cross sectional and pooled regressions on equations with different proxies 
for attention. A unique data set from the social trading platform Shareville was used. The attention 
hypothesis has been tested by primarily using the novel attention proxy; comments on assets on 
Shareville. The attention hypothesis could not be rejected, in the sense that comments on tradeable 
assets significantly increase closing order volume, which is in line with findings from related 
research. In contrast to most of the other research we also tested the expected case of reversed 
causality. The outcome show that volume significantly causes comments to increase. This suggest 
reversed causality is likely present when estimating the effect of comments on volume. The 
attention hypothesis was also tested by adding more variables to investigate it from more 
perspectives. We find that investors are not more prone to attention driven trading on Fridays and 
we also find that attention driven trading is stronger for buying than for selling as Barber and 
Odean (2008) argue. Our findings show no support for that attention effects are stronger for small 
capitalization firms, but it suggests that there is a significantly lower trading volume for the 30 
smallest stocks compared to the 30 largest stocks traded in Sweden. 
The results are supportive for theories of attention driven buying behaviour amongst retail 
investors. In other research, the attention driven buying seem to be costly for the retail investors. 
For institutional investors the attention driven buying behaviour amongst retail investors has been 
shown to predict stock returns. For stock brokers this implicates that attention driven behaviour 
should generate more brokerage on buy orders. However, due to the test of the reversed causality 
showing this is a problem, our results primarily motivates further research on presence of attention 
effects in the context of social trading platforms.  
Previous research has reported attention effects leaving traces on an aggregate level in terms of 
stock returns or turnover volume. The limitations of the data set used in this study, makes it 
impossible to investigate any effects on returns due to that Shareville is very small relative to the 
stock market as a whole. But the increasing popularity of social media and social trading platforms, 
like Shareville, makes it an interesting research area. Thus an idea for further research is to use 
similar data but use other econometrics techniques such as lagged variables, VAR analysis or use 
other proxies for attention. Then it might be possible to mitigate the problem of endogeneity and 
reversed causality. Also, combining several different methods testing the same proxy should be 
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interesting since other researchers use event studies on exogenous shocks and treatment groups to 
minimize the endogeneity problem2. Furthermore, an interesting aspect would be to see if the 
investors that do buy attention grabbing assets, benefit from picking them or not.  
  
                                                 
2 See Engelberg and Parsons (2011) and Shive (2012) who compare a treatment group’s 
behaviour to a control group that has not been exposed to the treatment.  
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Appendix 
 
The value of skewness is 2.86 and the value of kurtosis is 12.30. 
 
 
The value of skewness is 34.57 and the value of kurtosis is 3347.59. 
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The value of skewness is 2.73 and the value of kurtosis is 11.58. 
 
 
The value of skewness is 33.65 and the value of kurtosis is 2897.94. 
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The residuals have a value of skewness of 0.16 and a kurtosis of 15.99. 
 
Table 3.1: regressions of eq. 1a and eq.1b using data including outliers. 
These regressions are used as a test of robustness. 
 
 (Eq. 1a) 
Cross sectional 
(Eq. 1b) 
Cross sectional 
(Eq. 1a) 
Pooled 
(Eq. 1b) 
Pooled 
 Volume Comments Volume Comments 
     
Comments 0.473***  0.471***  
 (0.003)  (0.009)  
Volume  2.087***  1.813*** 
  (0.017)  (0.028) 
Constant 0.435*** -0.874*** 0.414*** 0.472*** 
 (0.008) (0.028) (0.075) (0.115) 
     
Observations 21,858 21,858 745,381 745,381 
R-squared 0.988 0.988 0.853 0.853 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Correlation of regressors 
This table shows the correlations of variables used in the equations. 
 Volume Comments MC ROE 
     
Volume 1    
     
Comments 0.874*** 1   
     
MC 0.127*** 0.138*** 1  
     
ROE 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.121*** 1 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
